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VIRGINIA'S CAPITAL MURDER SENTENCING
PROCEEDING: A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE
Alan W. Clarke*
Capital murder trials present a unique challenge to defense
counsel. Many capital defendants are demonstrably guilty of hei-
nous crimes, and a single-minded defense concentrating solely on
acquittal in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt will often
alienate the jury. The lawyer who focuses entirely on the guilt
stage without attending to the sentencing stage1 may be consigning
his client to the electric chair. This article deals with the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital murder trial, where life imprisonment, the
jury's only alternative to the death penalty,2 represents a victory
for the defense.
Guilt of a capital crime is not, by itself, legally sufficient to war-
rant the death penalty; the prosecution must also prove at least
one aggravating circumstance, as defined by statute, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.3 The defense may offer any arguably mitigating evi-
dence4 that raises a question about the propriety of a death sen-
tence. The defendant is constitutionally' entitled to introduce this
mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing despite the fact that
such evidence would not be admissible under state evidentiary
rules,5 and despite the fact that it does not relate to any of the
statutory mitigating circumstances.6 On the other hand, the prose-
* Clarke & Clarke, Kilmarnock, Virginia, Member of the Virginia Bar; B.A., William and
Mary, 1972; J.D., William and Mary, 1975. The author wishes to thank Richard Bonnie and
Lloyd Snook for their comments and suggestions in reviewing earlier drafts.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3 (Repl. Vol. 1983) (the sentencing stage follows immediately
upon a verdict of guilty of an offense punishable by death). Capital murder offenses are
defined at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Repl. Vol. 1982 & Supp. 1983).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
3. Id. See also Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
4. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1049 (1980).
5. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (vacating and remanding death sentence in mur-
der trial where defendant was denied opportunity to put on hearsay evidence indicating that
another was the triggerman).
6. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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cution's evidence in the penalty phase is limited to the aggravating
circumstances enumerated by statute.'
The extraordinary burdens placed on the prosecution at the pen-
alty phase are the direct result of the United States Supreme
Court's view of the uniqueness of the death penalty. The Court has
said that "death as a punishment is unique in its severity and ir-
revocability," and, thus, requires "a greater degree of reliability."'
The procedure "must channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear
and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guid-
ance,' and that 'make rationally reviewable the process for impos-
ing a sentence of death.' ,o In short, the Court has stated, "[a]
capital sentencing scheme must provide a 'meaningful basis' for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from
the many cases in which it is not."11
Virginia's statutory scheme is patterned after the Georgia and
Texas statutes upheld in Gregg v. Georgia12 and Jurek v. Texas"8
and is designed to bridle the sentencer's discretion within constitu-
tionally permissible bounds.14
7. Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1049 (1980). See also J. CARROLL, D. BALSKE, I. BuRuqm, S. ELLIAN, M. DEES, JR., TRIAL OF
THE PENALTY PHASE (1981) (published by The Southern Poverty Law Center) [hereinafter
cited as TmAL]. But see Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983) (indicating that there is no
constitutional right to restrict the factfinder to statutorily defined aggravating
circumstances).
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
9. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625
(1980) (holding that the greater degree of reliability required is applicable to the guilt stage
as well as the penalty stage).
10. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
11. Id. at 427.
12. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
14. See generally Comment, Godfrey v. Georgia: Possible Effects on Virginia's Death
Penalty Law, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 951 (1981). The Virginia Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty law many times. See, e.g., Mason v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d 116, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919 (1979); Waye v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 683, 251 S.E.2d 202 (1979); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248
S.E.2d 135 (1978). However, constitutional attacks, both facially and as applied, will con-
tinue, often on narrow procedural grounds. For example, the California Supreme Court held
that state's statutory vileness predicate to be unconstitutionally vague. People v. Superior
Court of Santa Clara County, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982).
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I. THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The Virginia Code provides:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Common-
wealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a
probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the defen-
dant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the of-
fense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society,
or that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, de-
pravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim. 5
These aggravating circumstances divide conceptually into: (1)
future dangerousness and (2) vileness. Justification of a death pen-
alty verdict requires jury unanimity on at least one of these two
aggravating circumstances.
Both the statutorily prescribed jury instruction and verdict form
describe the two aggravating circumstances in the alternative."0
How could one determine from such a verdict form whether the
jury was unanimous on a finding? A jury so instructed could well
split on one predicate or the other, while other jurors could find
both. This problem. was raised in Quintana v. Commonwealth,17
but the majority sidestepped the issue finding "affirmative ratifi-
cation of the verdict form by the defendant."1 8 The dissent, writ-
ten by Justice Poff, arguea that such errors are not subject to
waiver and that due process required commutation of the
sentence.19
Both "future dangerousness" and "vileness" are terms of art,
which have received judicial gloss that must be understood in or-
der for counsel to properly assess a client's case.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
16. Id. § 19.2-264.4(D). See also VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1-435 (Supp. 4,
1983). Cf. id. 1-437 (attempting to solve problem by having the jury "cross out any para-
graph, word or phrase which you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt").
17. 224 Va. 127, 295 S.E.2d 643 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1280, reh'g denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2113 (1983).
18. Id. at 148 n.6, 295 S.E.2d at 653-54 n.6.
19. Id. at 152, 295 S.E.2d at 656-57.
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A. Future Dangerousness
Future dangerousness apparently may be proven either by prior
convictions of violent crime or by "circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense."2 0 Both possibilities present problems.
The original sentencing statute referred to a defendant's "past
criminal record" as a basis for establishing future dangerousness.21
This was "designed to focus the fact-finder's attention on prior
criminal conduct .... If the defendant has been previously con-
victed of 'criminal acts of violence,' i.e., serious crimes against the
person committed by intentional acts of unprovoked violence,
there is a reasonable 'probability'. . . that he would commit simi-
lar crimes in the future. ' 22 Subsequently, "prior history" was sub-
stituted for "past criminal record ' 23 in section 19.2-264.4 of the
Virginia Code, but a related section retained the phrase "past
criminal record. '24
Did the legislature intend to broaden the type of evidence that
might show future dangerousness? If so, what beyond past convic-
tions could be used to show one's past history for violence? Rumor,
speculation and innuendo will remain inadmissible, leaving past
convictions as the main prosecutorial tool to prove a defendant's
past violent history. Due process concerns will prevent the intro-
duction of unreliable evidence, but it is conceivable that some well-
documented instances of past violent behavior not resulting in a
conviction may be held admissible. For example, details of a prior
violent crime, beyond the bare record of conviction, are admissible
under the statute as amended.25 Likewise, a defendant's admission
to others of having committed serious violent crimes has been
properly received under the party admissions exception to the
hearsay rule. 6
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
21. See id. § 19.2-264.2 where the "past criminal record" language is retained. This does
not render the statutory scheme unconstitutionally vague. LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225
Va. 564, 304 S.E.2d 271 (1983).
22. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
24. Id. § 19.2-264.2.
25. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
972 (1980).
26. Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 295 S.E.2d 643 (1982) (defendant's state-
ments concerning crimes committed while residing in Cuba made to fellow inmate following
his arrest).
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Despite this adverse precedent, counsel should argue that evi-
dence of a defendant's "prior history" should be regarded as le-
gally insufficient to support a finding of future dangerousness un-
less it includes a record of convictions for serious crimes against
the person committed by intentional acts of unprovoked violence.
In other words, the dangerousness circumstance should not be.
predicated solely on historical evidence which is of questionable
reliability.
Counsel should emphasize that reliance on such historical evi-
dence raises serious constitutional questions. For example, the
Georgia Supreme Court has held that a trial court finding of an
aggravating circumstance based on a murder "committed by a per-
son who has a substantial history of [assault] convictions" was un-
constitutionally vague. 27 Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for reliability in the ad-
ministration of the death sentence and precision in the definition
and proof of aggravating circumstances. The Court has recently
stated that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" and that "statu-
tory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary
function at the stage of legislative definition [by] circumscrib[ing]
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. '2 Thus, in any
case in which a death sentence is predicated upon a finding of fu-
ture dangerousness, and in which this finding is not supported by
evidence of a prior record of convictions for serious crimes against
the person, the imposition of the death penalty is constitutionally
suspect.
Circumstances surrounding the offense can likewise prove dan-
gerousness, but something more is required other than the fact of
the homicide itself. Some homicides by their nature indicate that
they are a part of a series to follow. For example, a hired killer
may kill one of two targets in a murder-for-hire contract before
being caught. In one case, the slaying of a second person shortly
after a capital murder was introduced along with defendant's prior
criminal record and threats of future harm to others to prove fu-
ture dangerousness. 29 In Evans v. Commonwealth,"0 evidence that
the defendant came to Virginia in custody, ostensibly to testify,
27. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, , 224 S.E.2d 386, 392 (1976).
28. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742-43 (1983).
29. Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 (1980).
30. 222 Va. 766, 284 S.E.2d 816 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982).
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but actually with a plan to escape and to kill any person who at-
tempted to prevent his escape, was admitted along with defen-
dant's prior criminal record for violence to show future
dangerousness.
How far can the prosecution go in raising surrounding circum-
stances as proof of future dangerousness where there is no prior
history of violent behavior? Defense counsel should be prepared in
such circumstances to argue that the evidence of a capital crime,
without more, is insufficient proof, and that the jury should not be
instructed on future dangerousness absent previous convictions for
"serious crimes against the person committed by intentional acts
of unprovoked violence." 1 The prosecution will, if the evidence
permits, point to other violent acts or threats against others which
are related to the underlying capital crime. The court must then
determine whether these other acts are sufficiently related and are'
sufficiently predictive of future violence to be admissible.
B. Vileness
The vileness predicate focuses the fact-finder's attention on the
circumstances of the offense, specifically on those aspects of the
defendant's conduct which set the crime apart from the other pre-
meditated homicides defined as capital offenses.3 2 Standing alone,
the language of the statute - "that [the defendant's] conduct in
committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggra-
vated battery to the victim"3 3 - is exceedingly vague and requires
further definition. The United States Supreme Court conceded as
much in 1976 when it considered a vagueness challenge to the
Georgia statute from which this language is drawn, and stated that
"[iut is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of
mind or an aggravated battery. But this language need not be con-
strued in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Su-
preme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construc-
tion. '3 4 Although the Court upheld the Georgia statute on its face,
the Court clearly contemplated that the Georgia Supreme Court
31. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979).
32. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Repl. Vol. 1982 & Supp. 1983).
33. Id. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
34. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976) (plurality opinion), reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
875 (1976).
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and the high courts of other states with similar aggravating cir-
cumstances statutes would adopt objectifying and clarifying
definitions.3 5
The Virginia Supreme Court has not yet. construed the element
of torture in the vileness provision. The Florida Supreme Court,
however, construed an analogous "cruelty" requirement to mean
that the defendant's conduct "was designed to inflict a high degree
of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffer-
ing [of the victim]."38
"Aggravated battery" has been defined by the Virginia Supreme
Court as "a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more
culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of mur-
der. '37 One wonders whether this language is sufficiently precise to
provide adequate guidance to the finder of fact regarding the con-
duct required to distinguish aggravated battery from the injurious
conduct inherent in any premeditated murder. In Godfrey v. Geor-
gia,38 the United States Supreme Court noted with apparent ap-
proval a Georgia Supreme Court decision which limited "aggra-
vated battery" to serious physical injury to or dismemberment of
the victim prior to the death-dealing blow.3 9 However, the Virginia
Supreme Court, noting that this was not the ratio decidendi of
Godfrey, has left open the possibility that a post-murder battery
could be admitted to prove "aggravated battery. '40 Whether such
evidence will establish "aggravated battery" under Virginia law or
under the constitutional rulings remains an open question.
"Depravity of mind" generates the most serious vagueness con-
cerns. The phrase defies precise analysis. In fact, in 1977, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court stated, that "the depravity of mind contem-
plated by the statute is that which results in torture or aggravated
battery to the victim. . !41 It thus appears that the Georgia
35. Id. at 198.
36. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fa 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). The
Arizona Supreme Court has adopted a similar construction. State'v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531,
562 P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
37. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979).
38. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
39. Id. at 431-32 & n.13.
40. Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 79, 286 S.E.2d 162, 169-70, cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 181 (1982), reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 771 (1983).
41. Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 299, 236 S.E.2d 637, 643, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960
(1977).
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court was sufficiently concerned about the vagueness of this con-
cept to conclude that "depravity of mind" is not an independent
ground for finding aggravating circumstances but is dependent
upon proof of aggravated battery or torture. As the United States
Supreme Court put it, the Georgia Supreme Court had concluded
that "depravity of mind" comprehended "only the kind of mental
state that led the murderer to torture or to commit an aggravated
battery before killing his victim.1 42 It was this interpretation that
gave rise to the problem presented to the United States Supreme
Court in Godfrey. The defendant in Godfrey shot and instantly
killed his mother-in-law and wife, and then informed police that he
had "done a hideous crime [and that he had been] thinking about
it for eight years [and would] do it again. '4 The defendant and his
wife had been experiencing considerable marital discord, and the
defendant had come to believe that his mother-in-law was respon-
sible for his wife's decision not to reconcile the marriage. After
Godfrey had been convicted of murder, the proceeding moved into
the sentencing phase where the prosecution relied solely on the
"vileness" provision to establish the predicate for the death pen-
alty. The prosecution conceded that no torture had occurred, and
argued instead that the case involved aggravated battery. The jury
returned the death sentence and Godfrey appealed.
The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the death sentence;"4 how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that the Georgia Supreme Court had not consistently applied its
previous law regarding the meaning of "vileness. 4 5 The Court
noted that the evidence did not establish aggravated battery as
that term previously had been construed by the Georgia Supreme
Court because neither of Godfrey's victims suffered "any physical
injury preceding their deaths. '46 Moreover, as was noted above, the
Georgia Supreme Court had earlier stated that the phrase "deprav-
ity of mind" comprehended only the kind of mental state that led
the murderer to torture or to commit an aggravated battery before
killing his victim.47
In Godfrey, the United States Supreme Court, reconciling Geor-
42. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 431.
43. Id. at 425-26.
44. Id. at 420.
45. Id. at 428-29.
46. Id. at 432.
47. Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 236 S.E.2d 637, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1977).
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gia case law, held that under Georgia law "torture," "depravity of
mind," and "aggravated battery" must be construed in pari
materia.48 The Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court and
the trial court had decided the case incorrectly under Georgia law,
and that the state court's failure to apply consistently its own law
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. In announcing this substantive standard, the
Court relied on the same cases which the Virginia Supreme Court
relied on in construing the same terms.49 However, the Virginia Su-
preme Court has held that "depravity of mind can exist indepen-
dently of the presence of torture. or aggravated battery and may
alone support a finding of vileness as a basis for a sentence of
death. '50 Since the Virginia Supreme Court did not define "de-
pravity of mind," the scope of this aggravating circumstance re-
mains vague.
The United States Supreme Court concluded in Godfrey that
the defendant's "crimes [could not] be said to have reflected a con-
sciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person
guilty of murder. ' 51 This suggests that even if the term "depravity
of mind" has independent content under state law, the Court will
impose constitutional limitations on the meaning of the phrase.
This issue has not yet been squarely posed in Virginia; the Virginia
Supreme Court has thus far distinguished Godfrey either because
torture or an aggravated battery has been involved or because the
dangerousness predicate has established the basis for the death
penalty.52 Recent cases indicate that the Virginia Supreme Court
will narrowly confine Godfrey to its facts;53 however, this should
not deter counsel from raising the issue where appropriate.
H. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The Virginia Code enumerates several "facts in mitigation"
which may be asserted by a defendant:
48. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 430.
49. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979).
50. Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 442, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282 (1983).
51. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433.
52. See, e.g., Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 286 S.E.2d 162, cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 181 (1982), reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 771 (1983); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513,
273 S.E.2d 36 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981).
53. See, e.g., Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271 (1983); Peterson v.
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 302 S.E.2d 520 (1983).
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Evidence which may be admissible, subject to the rules of evidence
governing admissibility, may include the circumstances surrounding
the offense, the history and background of the defendant, and any
other facts in mitigation of the offense. Facts in mitigation may in-
clude, but shall not be limited to, the following: (i) The defendant
has no significant history of prior criminal activity, or (ii) the capital
felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or (iii) the victim was a
participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act, or
(iv) at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly im-
paired, or (v) the age of the defendant at the time of the commission
of the capital offense. 4
Facts in mitigation are not limited to those mentioned in the
statute, and the defense may introduce any arguably mitigating ev-
idence. 5 This implies that the defendant is entitled to an instruc-
tion that lists any other possibly mitigating circumstances. For ex-
ample, assume a case involved provocation that was insufficient to
reduce the grade of the offense to manslaughter. Even though the
statute does not mention it, the provocation could be viewed as a
mitigating circumstance, and defense counsel should argue for a
jury instruction including that point. 6
The defendant may also be constitutionally entitled to introduce
hearsay or other matters not permitted under state evidentiary
rules.57 However, not everything imaginable by counsel will be ad-
mitted. For example, evidence of the effect of defendant's incarcer-
ation on defendant's relatives is not admissible.5 8 Likewise, evi-
dence that codefendants received life imprisonment is
inadmissible.5 9
The use of witnesses such as eyewitnesses to an execution or
Christian ethicists - who testify to the cruelty, immorality or dis-
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
55. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 85-90 for the arguments for and against jury in-
structions on mitigating circumstances.
57. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (vacating and remanding death sentence in
murder trial where defendant was denied opportunity to put on hearsay evidence indicating
that another was the triggerman).
58. Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 253, 257 S.E.2d 797, 804 (1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1103 (1980).
59. Id. at 954, 257 S.E.2d at 804-05.
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criminatory impact of the death penalty - has been controversial,
with a split of authority among the courts that have confronted
such issues.6 0 The testimony of an ethicist or minister is more
likely to be admissible if the witness meets with and counsels the
defendant before trial.
III. DEFENSE TACTICS FOR THE PENALTY STAGE
It is beyond the scope of this article to address all the possible
defense tactics for the penalty stage of a capital murder case61
However, a few comments are in order.
A. Proof of Aggravating Circumstances
Since a death verdict cannot be justified without proof of at least
one aggravating circumstance, it behooves counsel to determine
what the prosecution will offer to establish the existence of such
circumstances. The circumstances surrounding the crime will be
generally known to counsel. Defendant's past criminal record is
easily obtainable from most police or sheriff's departments upon
proper authorization by the defendant. However, facts underlying
the "vileness" predicate may not be immediately apparent; infor-
mal discovery through conversations with the prosecution and its
witnesses may not suffice.
Unfortunately, in Virginia there is no statutory right to force
disclosure of evidence relating to aggravating circumstances. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that "the preferred
practice is to make known to [the defendant] before trial the evi-
dence that is to be adduced at the penalty stage if he is found
guilty. 6 2 Such circumstances are arguably a part of the charge
reachable by a bill of particulars under rule 3A:8 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Virginia. Also, one can argue that the lack of
any aggravating circumstances is exculpatory (in the sense that it
tends to lessen the degree of the offense) and, thus is discoverable
by a Brady motion. 3
Neither argument has succeeded in the one circuit court opinion
60. TRIAL, supra note 7.
61. For an excellent discussion of defense strategies in capital cases, see Balske, New
Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REv. 331 (1979).
62. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 298, 302 S.E.2d 520, 526 (1983).
63. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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of which the author is aware." Thus, although formal discovery
may serve to educate opposing counsel, such discovery should be
actively pursued where the facts suggest an absence of aggravating
circumstances. In such a case, the motion is justified in order to
educate the factfinder concerning the Commonwealth's burden to
prove more than the elements of capital murder in order to con-
demn a man to death. Such a motion can provide an excellent
springboard for discussion of Godfrey and its effect on Virginia ju-
risprudence . 5 Ultimately, defense counsel may persuade the court
to deny or modify jury instructions and lay the basis for a later
motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence offered at the sen-
tencing stage.
Counsel should attempt, on the record, to prevent jury instruc-
tions and any argument concerning aggravating circumstances for
which there is no evidence. The defense should stress that the
Commonwealth must prove each alleged aggravating circumstance
and must cite cases which narrowly define each such circumstance.
Counsel should argue that the jury would be misled by instructions
on matters which do not come within the cited definitions, noting
that a death verdict requires a greater degree of reliability than is
required for other sentencing decisions.6 Moreover, the defense
should prepare instructions with favorable definitions of the aggra-
vating circumstances. However, the giving of such instructions is
discretionary; the court is not required under Virginia decisions to
give any definitions of the aggravating circumstances to the jury,6
although this practice is constitutionally questionable.
Occasionally, the state will charge capital murder in a case de-
void of aggravating circumstances. This is possible because aggra-
vating circumstances are not, strictly speaking, a part of the crime
itself - they only become relevant at the sentencing phase after
the elements of capital murder have been established. If unchal-
lenged, this works to the prosecution's advantage in proving guilt.
The ostensible death penalty case carries with it the concomitant
64. Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 1179-1185 (Cir. Ct. Essex County Feb. 4, 1983) (Foster,
J.). However, this opinion predates Peterson (see text accompanying note 2). Thus, the Pe-
terson dicta should be argued if this issue arises.
65. See Comment, Godfrey v. Georgia: Possible Effects on Virginia's Death Penalty Law,
15 U. RICH. L. REv. 951 (1981).
66. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
67. See Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271 (1983); Clark v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980). See also
Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1983).
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right to cull the venire of jurors who are so opposed to the death
penalty that they cannot abide by their oaths to consider the death
penalty;"8 this yields a jury that is willing to find guilt and con-
demn a man to die.6" Defense counsel should resist this by filing a'
pretrial motion to dismiss the capital charge or to prevent opposi-
tion to the death penalty from being a basis for jury qualification. 70
Counsel should argue that the advantage gained by death qualify-
ing the jury panel where there is no possibility of a legitimate
death verdict violates due process. This argument can also be used
to bolster a motion for individual sequestered voir dire.7 1 Such
jury-probing can palliate the adverse effects of death qualifying the
venire. While there is no guarantee of success, there is little to lose
and much to gain.
Such motions may fail, yet they bring important collateral bene-
fits in instructing the jury, in a possible later motion to strike the
death penalty portion of the trial, or to overturn a death verdict.
Furthermore, the record will be preserved for later attacks in the
federal courts. Preparing the record for habeas corpus appeals is a
legitimate and important part of counsel's task in death penalty
68. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 43-45 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978).
69. See Hovey v. Superior Court of Alameda City, 28 CaL 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (1980) (citing studies with statistical data). See also Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F.
Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd in part, modified in part, 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980). The
argument that death qualified juries-those culled of individuals who so vehemently oppose
the death penalty that they would be unable to consider its imposition as a punish-
ment-violate due process by being guilt prone was rejected in Virginia in Justus v. Com-
monwealth, 222 Va. 667, 283 S.E.2d 905 (1981) on the ground that use of statistics from
other states is of little relevance in assessing Virginia juries and because, as is noted in
Hovey concerning California, Virginia courts must exclude jurors prone to the death pen-
alty. See Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 283 S.E.2d 212 (1981). This factor was
not accounted for in the studies cited in Hovey. Recent, not-yet published studies show that
such juries remain guilt-prone regardless of the exclusion of death penalty prone jurors. See
J. Kadane, After Hovey: Taking Account of the Automatic Death Penalty Jurors (unpub-
lished manuscript available from Dept. of Statistics, Carnegie-Mellon University). The Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense Fund can assist
counsel in locating the post-Hovey studies necessary to maintain the due process attack in
light of Justus, and local psychologists may be available to meet the objection that the
studies were conducted in states other than Virginia. It is important to continue to make a
good record on this issue because it is doubtful that the Virginia Supreme Court will be the
last word on the subject.
70. See Koblitz, Hertz, Amsterdam, The Witherspoon Manual 2d: Suggested Trial Strate-
gies, Objections and Canned Briefs for Defense Attorneys in Capital Cases Where the Prose-
cution Undertakes to Death Qualify the Jury (Apr. 1979) (distributed by the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund).
71. Cf. McConquodale v. Balkcom, 705 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1983). Contra Turner v. Com-
monwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273 S.E.2d 36 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981).
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cases.
The one thing that is certain in the event of a death sentence is
that there will be an appeal, and that appeal may ultimately suc-
ceed on the basis of a ground that may have seemed, in the heat of
trial battle, insignificant. It is extremely important that counsel
preserve facial constitutionality claims at every possible stage, lest
these issues be deemed to have been waived.72
B. Developing a Case in Mitigation
Counsel must do more than merely bring out the statutorily ap-
proved mitigating circumstances. Counsel should look for, and at-
tempt to prove, anything that will dispose the jury toward life im-
prisonment. Finances permitting, consultations with a juristic
psychologist can aid in discovering and honing arguments as well
as in picking the jury."3
Many capital crimes trigger a defense inquiry into the defen-
dant's sanity at the time of the offense or competency to stand
trial. The use of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental
health professionals for these purposes is familiar to most criminal
defense practitioners. However, the use of such witnesses in the
sentencing phase of capital cases differs from their use in the sen-
tencing of other serious felonies. 4
Capital defendants may introduce evidence of their extreme
emotional disturbance or lack of capacity to control conduct as a
mitigating circumstance, 5 even though such evidence would fall
short of proving insanity.76 This right would be rendered nugatory
without a concomitant right to a professional evaluation by a fo-
rensic specialist who is willing to testify at sentencing. Thus, the
capital murder sections should be read in pari materia with the
general code sections providing for psychiatric evaluations in crim-
inal cases." This implied statutory right to a pretrial evaluation
for capital sentencing purposes "should be viewed as essential to
72. An excellent checklist of possible motions and arguments may be found in Motions
for Capital Cases (1981) (published by The Southern Poverty Law Center).
73. See, e.g., Frederick, Jury Behavior: A Psychologist Examines Jury Selection, 5 Omo
N.U.L. REV. 571 (1978).
74. See Bonnie, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in Virginia, 66
VA. L. REv. 167 (1980).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
76. Bonnie, supra note 74 at 182-85.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168 to -169.7 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
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the effective assistance of counsel. 7 s
Martin v. Commonwealth,9 which held that an indigent has no
constitutional right to a court appointed psychiatrist, predates the
present sections governing proceedings on the question of in-
sanity."' These sections clearly contemplate an independent foren-
sic examination at the state's expense, with an attendant right, af-
ter notice of intention to present evidence of insanity, for the
prosecution to seek a second opinion. One can argue that there is a
constitutional right to a forensic evaluation to develop mitigating
circumstances.8 ' Defense counsel should argue vigorously for the
right to an examination to explore the availability of mitigating
evidence for the capital sentencing procedure, whether or not the
defendant's legal sanity is at issue. This examination should be
performed by a person "who is qualified by training and experi-
ence,"8 2 that is, a specially-trained forensic scientist.8 3 If the Final
Report of the Task Force on the Insanity Defense" is adopted by
the Virginia legislature, the implied rights outlined here will be
made explicit.
Several pitfalls must be avoided in using this type of testimony.
The present statute provides no guidance on the use of mitigating
evidence. Defense counsel should proffer jury instructions listing
and explaining any mitigating circumstances raised by the evi-
dence and advising the jury that they need not impose the death
penalty. But such instructions may be refused or modified by the
court. As a result, one author has opined that "it is possible that a
defendant's attempt to establish mitigating circumstances [by] in-
troducing evidence of an emotional or personality disorder could
actually increase the likelihood of a death sentence." 5
The United States Supreme Court's emphasis on permitting evi-
78. Bonnie, supra note 74 at 186.
79. 221 Va. 436, 271 S.E.2d 123 (1980).
80. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-168 to -169.7 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
81. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1477, 1487 (11th Cir. 1983).
82. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-169.1(A), -169.5(A) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
83. Forensic training and certification is provided by contract to the Department of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation by Blue Ridge Hospital at the Institute of Law,
Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. See 2 DEvELophIENTs IN MENTAL
HEALTH LAW 16 (1982).
84. Final Report of the Task Force on the Insanity Defense (Nov. 30, 1982) (submitted to
the Honorable Joseph L. Fisher, Secretary of Human Resorces, Commonwealth of Virginia).
85. Jo INr CoMhMrrEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, VA. ST. BAR & VA. BAR Ass'N,
DEFENDING CRIaNAL CASES IN VMGi A 61 (1981).
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dence of all arguably mitigating circumstances"8 strongly supports
the right of the defendant to some form of explanatory instruction
to the jury on any mitigating circumstances fairly presented by the
evidence. The Virginia Supreme Court has hinted that instructions
singling out mitigating circumstances may be improper.8 7 However,
circuit courts generally give an instruction enumerating aggravat-
ing circumstances as set forth in the statute.8 s Presumably, a care-
fully worded instruction tracking the mitigating circumstances set
forth in the Code89 would be permissible. Additionally, a strong
constitutional argument can be made that "jury instructions must
'describe the nature and functions of mitigating circumstances' and
'communicate to the jury that the law recognizes the existence of
facts or circumstances which, though not justifying or excusing the
offense, may properly be considered in determining whether to im-
pose the death sentence.' "90
Additionally, a well-trained forensic psychiatrist or psychologist
will ordinarily be able to advise defendant's attorney on the best
use of such testimony. While caution is advisable in using any ex-
pert consultant or witness, the failure to at least consider the use
of forensic testimony at the sentencing phase may be tantamount
to malpractice.
C. Fifth and Sixth Amendment Concerns
The prosecution may attempt to introduce psychiatric testimony
based on interviews with the defendant to establish future danger-
ousness.91 The ability of clinicians to predict future dangerousness
is suspect, and "a strong case can be made.., that the prosecution
should not be permitted to offer clinical testimony on the defen-
dant's dangerousness unless the defendant has already done So. ''92
The United States Supreme Court has held that such evidence
does not violate the Constitution. Defense counsel should attack
86. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
87. LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983).
88. VmGINLU MODEL JURY INSTRUCTONS 1-439 (1983).
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (RepL VoL 1983).
90. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1477, 1503 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Spivey v. Zant, 661
F.2d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1981)).
91. Giarrantano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 (1980).
92. Bonnie, supra note 74 at 176.
93. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
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this type of evidence on state evidentiary grounds. The American
Psychiatric Association (APA) views such evidence as unreliable.
Scientifically unreliable evidence is not admissible in Virginia or
elsewhere. 4 Thus, a sustained attack on the reliability of such evi-
dence, using defense experts, reference to scholarly journals, the
APA, and extensive voir dire of the prosecution expert, may result
in excluding this type of evidence.
What are the limits on prosecutorial use of defendant's state-
ments made to a psychiatrist or opinions derived from those state-
ments? Defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and sixth
amendment right to counsel are violated where the prosecution in-
troduces psychiatric testimony at the penalty phase based on de-
fendant's uncounseled pretrial statement to a court appointed psy-
chiatrist. 5 Disclosure of statements made by the defendant during
a competency or sanity evaluation is prohibited by statute "except
on the issue of his mental condition at the time of the offense after
he raises the issue pursuant to [s]ection 19.2-168." 96
Capital sentencing evaluations for emotional disturbance or lack
of capacity should be governed by the same principles. The Task
Force on the Insanity Defense 97 has proposed clarifying legislation
which would prevent disclosure to the prosecution of defendant's
statements to the mental health evaluators appointed at defen-
dant's behest to determine defendant's mental or emotional condi-
tion for capital sentencing purposes. Under this proposal, the pros-
ecution will only be informed of the evaluator's conclusions; if
defense counsel gives notice of an intent to use such testimony at
sentencing, the prosecution will be permitted to seek a second
evaluation. If the defendant refuses to cooperate, the court would
be authorized to disclose such fact to the jury.
Defense counsel should be prepared to argue that the above is
already the law under the present statutes. The right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel at sentencing means little if defendant
cannot obtain a confidential mental evaluation from a competent
mental health professional to assist in the sentencing phase. Miti-
gating evidence of emotional disturbance can only be ferreted out
effectively if procedures similar to those proposed by the Task
94. E.g., Skinner v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 260 (1971); see also Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); MCCORMICK, EvmEcE § 203, (3d ed. 1984).
95. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.7 (RepL Vol. 1983).
97. See supra note 84.
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Force are adopted.
D. Should the Defendant be Executed?
Humanize the defendant. Have his family present; let them tes-
tify. Bring out the reason, however horrible, for your client's ac-
tions; then put the reason into a proper perspective given your cli-
ent's background. Attend to the defendant's appearance, and try to
project a sincere concern for your client as a human being without
condoning his actions. The more human you can make your client,
the less likely a jury will be able to return a death verdict.
Counsel should be more conscious of the desirability of having
the defendant take the witness stand than might ordinarily be the
case. Obviously, no per se rule can be adopted that the defendant
should always testify; however, the defendant may have little to
lose at the sentencing stage. When all else fails, counsel should at-
tack the propriety of any death penalty.9 8
Nonetheless counsel must anticipate the possibility of an adverse
verdict. Many prosecutors only bring capital charges in the most
egregious circumstances where they have the greatest possibility of
success. Lesser cases tend to be plea bargained.
Do not give up hope in the face of an adverse verdict. Even if
there is some evidence of aggravation, and the jury has returned a
death verdict, all is not lost. Trial and appellate courts cannot re-
view such a verdict under the traditional "error of law" criterion,
but must independently evaluate the propriety of the sentence.99
Arguments that aggravating circumstances have not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, or are outweighed by mitigating cir-
cumstances, are germane and appropriate. However, counsel still
must overcome the usual reluctance of judges to overturn a jury
verdict.
IV. CONCLUSION
Anthony Amsterdam, who is perhaps the most proficient appel-
late capital murder defense advocate, speculates that "great lawy-
ering at the right time would save virtually everybody who is going
98. TRiA, supra note 7 (contains many arguments and ideas that can be adapted to virtu-
ally any case).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1(C) (RepL. Vol. 1982), § 19.2-264.5 (Repl. Vol. 1983). See also
Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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to be executed."100 The penalty stage is singularly difficult. Sen-
tencing advocacy comes on the heels of an emotionally draining
trial and guilty verdict. One can never adequately prepare oneself
for an adverse verdict regardless of its likelihood on the facts. For-
tunately, most lawyers can be effective.
This effective advocacy, however, demands preparation. The ex-
treme preparation that is required in capital cases may well limit
the number of death sentences imposed and will help defense
counsel lay the groundwork for appeal.
100. Anderson, An Eye for an Eye, TimE, Jan. 24, 1983, at 39.
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